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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The State appeals from the district court's order granting Sunny Riley's motion to
suppress. The district court correctly concluded the State did not meet its burden of showing
Officer Kingland did not deviate from the purpose of a traffic stop of Ms. Riley by asking her
questions that were unrelated to the purpose of the stop (driving with expired registration tags),
and by having a conversation with two backup officers that was unrelated to the purpose of the
stop. The district court correctly concluded these two deviations measurably extended the
duration of Ms. Riley's seizure, violating her rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officer Kingland stopped Ms. Riley for driving with expired registration tags. (R., p.75.)
Ms. Riley told the officer she did not have a valid driver's license or proof of insurance, and said
she had previously been arrested for failing to pay a traffic citation. (R., pp.75-76.) While
Ms. Riley was looking for something to prove her identity, Officer Kingland asked her if she was
on probation, and asked about any prior arrests. (R., p.76.) Ms. Riley found a dental insurance
card with her name on it, and provided it to the officer as proof of her identity. (R., p.76.)
The officer took a pen and notepad from his pocket and wrote down Ms. Riley's name
and date of birth. (R., p.76.) After he put the pen and notepad back in his pocket, he asked, "All
right, nothing illegal in the car I need to worry about?" (R., p.76.) Ms. Riley answered, "No."
(R., p.76.) He then asked, ''No marijuana, drug pipes, anything crazy like that?" (R., p.76.)
Ms. Riley answered, "No." (R., p.76.) The district court found it took approximately eight
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seconds for the officer to ask and receive answers to these questions. (R., pp.77-78.) Officer
Kingsland then told Ms. Riley he would issue her a couple citations and let her go. (State's Ex. 4
at 05:10-05:15.)
Officer Kingland returned to his patrol car and called for backup. (R., p.78.) He testified
at the suppression hearing that he believed Ms. Riley had been using drugs, or had some drugs
hidden in her car, because her voice was trembling and she was speaking quickly. (R., p.78.)
When the two backup officers arrived, Officers Miles and Ellison, Officer Kingland stopped
writing the citations, had a conversation with them about his suspicion that Ms. Riley had been
using drugs, and asked if they could try to obtain Ms. Riley's consent to a search of her vehicle.
(R., p.78; Tr., p.22, Ls.8-23.) The conversation between Officer Kingland and the two backup
officers cannot be seen or heard on any of the video recordings. (See State's Exs. 1-4.) Officer
Kingland was asked at the suppression hearing whether the conversation lasted "longer than a
minute-and-a-half or two minutes" and he answered he was "not sure" but knew "it was brief"
(Tr., p.28, Ls.15-21.)
After conversing with Officer Kingland, the two backup officers began a drug
investigation while Officer Kingland resumed writing the citations. (R., p.78.) Ultimately,
another officer, Officer Lane, arrived with a drug detection dog, and the dog alerted on
Ms. Riley's vehicle. (R., p.79.) Officer Kingland completed writing his two citations 48 seconds
after the dog alerted. (R., p.79.)
Officers found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in Ms. Riley's vehicle, and the
State charged Ms. Riley with one count of possession of a controlled substance, and one count of
possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.26-27.) Ms. Riley filed a motion to suppress, arguing
the stop of her vehicle was unlawfully extended. (R., pp.36, 42-52.) The State filed an objection
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to Ms. Riley's motion. (R., pp.55-67.) The district court held a hearing, and heard testimony
from Officers Kingland and Lane. (See Tr., p.6.) The parties stipulated to the admission of the
on-body video recordings from Officer Miles (State's Ex. 1); Officer Lane (State's Ex. 2);
Officer Ellison (State's Ex. 3); and Officer Kingland (State's Ex. 4). (Tr., p.8, L.16- p.10, L.17.)
The district court granted Ms. Riley's motion to suppress. (R., pp. 75-86.) The district
court found Officer Kingland deviated twice from the purpose of the stop-first, by asking
Ms. Riley if she had any illegal items in her vehicle, and second, by having a conversation with
Officers Miles and Ellison regarding his suspicion that Ms. Riley had been using drugs, and
asking if they could try to obtain Ms. Riley's consent to a search of her vehicle. (Id.) The district
court found these deviations delayed the stop by more than 48 seconds, which was the time it
took Officer Kingland to complete the citations following the drug dog alert. (Id.) Because the
deviations delayed the stop by more than 48 seconds, they prolonged Ms. Riley's detention. (Id.)
The district court explained its conclusion as follows:
Here the officer asked Ms. Riley questions about items in her car that were
unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop; a de minimus delay certainly, but a
measurable one. He also delayed his traffic investigation to engage in a
conversation with other officers about his suspicions that she had used illegal
drugs recently and about them getting consent to search her car. That conversation
was not related to the purpose of the traffic stop. The State bears the burden of
persuading this court that those deviations from the purpose of the stop did not
measurably extend the duration of Ms. Riley's seizure; the State has failed to do
so here.
(R., p.84.) The State filed a motion to reconsider, arguing the two deviations found by the district
court "only took 30 seconds" and thus did not extend the duration of the stop. (R., pp.91-92.)
Before the district court could consider or rule on the State's motion, the State filed a notice of
appeal, and the district court vacated the hearing on the State's motion. (R., pp.97-112.)

3

ISSUE
Did the district court correctly grant Ms. Riley's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Granted Ms. Riley's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The State makes two arguments on appeal. (Appellant's Br., p.8.) First, the State

contends the district court clearly erred in fmding the conversation between Officer Kingland
and Officer Miles lasted more than 40 seconds. (Appellant's Br., p.8.) The State asserts this
conversation "can be seen" on Officer Miles' s on-body video recording, and lasted "no longer
than 20 seconds." (Appellant's Br., p.8.) The State is incorrect. As an initial matter, the district
court found Officer Kingland engaged in a conversation with Officer Miles and Officer Ellison.
Thus, Officer Miles's on-body video recording cannot, in and of itself, resolve the question of
how long the conversation between Officer Kingland and Officers Miles and Ellison lasted.
Moreover, the district court correctly found that the duration of the conversation cannot be
determined based on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.
Second, the State contends the district court erred in concluding Officer Kingland
unlawfully pro longed the stop by asking Ms. Riley if she had anything illegal in her vehicle and
by having a conversation with Officer Miles which was unrelated to the purpose of the stop. 1
(Appellant's Br., p.8.) The State asserts these actions did not extend the duration of the stop, but
the State is incorrect. The district court correctly concluded these two deviations measurably
extended the duration of Ms. Riley's seizure, thus violating her rights under the Fourth
Amendment.
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Again, the State refers to the conversation as one between Officer Kingland and Officer Miles,
but the district court referred to it repeatedly as a conversation between Officer Kingland and
"the responding officers." (Compare Appellant's Br., p.8, with R., pp.75-85.)
5

B.

Standard Of Review
"In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

the standard of review is bifurcated." State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009) (citation
omitted). "This Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. However, this Court may freely review the trial court's application of constitutional
principles in light of the facts found." Id. (citations omitted). "At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court." State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App.
2005) (citations omitted).

C.

The District Court Did Not Clearly Err In Finding The Conversation Between Officer
Kingland And The Backup Officers, Which Was Unrelated To the Purpose Of The Stop,
Took Longer Than 40 Seconds
A critical question in this case was whether the conversation between Officer Kingland

and Officers Miles and Ellison, which was unrelated to the purpose of the stop, lasted more than
40 seconds. If the conversation lasted more than 40 seconds, then it extended the duration of
Ms. Riley's seizure, because, combined with the 8-second delay attributable to Officer
Kingland's earlier unrelated questioning of Ms. Riley, it exceeded the time it took for Officer
Kingland to complete writing the citations following the drug dog alert. (See R., p.81.)
In resolving this critical factual question, the district court said "[t]he evidence regarding
the length of that conversation between the officers is sparse. As stated earlier, it is not contained
on any of the videos. The only testimony given about how long that conversation took is the
testimony described above: [Officer Kingland] could not estimate the time but said it was
'brief."' (R., p.81.) The court stated in its written order that it could "only guess" at how long the
conversation lasted. (R., p.82.) Because it could "only guess" at the length of the conversation
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based on the evidence presented, the court resolved the factual dispute in Ms. Riley's favor, and
found the conversation took longer than 40 seconds. (R., p.82.) The district court did not err.
There were four video recordings admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing.
(Tr., p.8, L.16 - p.10, L.17.) The State asserts in the Appellant's Brief that the conversation
between Officer Kingland and Officer Miles "can be seen" on Officer Miles' s video recording,
and lased "no longer than 20 seconds." (Appellant's Br., p.8.) The State is wrong. The
conversation between Officer Kingland and Officers Miles and Ellison can be neither seen nor
heard on any of the recordings. (See generally State's Exs.1-4.)
Officer Kingland' s on-body video recording reflects that he questioned Ms. Riley, then
returned to his patrol car, and turned his audio of£ (State's Ex. 4 at 05:36.) He remained in his
patrol car until the recording ends. (State's Ex. 4 at 05:36-16:08.) During the period of time that
Officer Kingland was in his patrol car, the video shows the officer's computer screen, the
steering wheel, the officer's hand, his pen, his citation book, and his cell phone. (Id.) There is no
indication when Officer Kingland conversed with Officers Miles and Ellison, and thus no
indication how long that conversation lasted. (See id.)
Officer Ellison's on-body video recording begins with an image of Ms. Riley in her
vehicle, being questioned by another officer. (State's Ex. 3 at 00:00-00:20.) This video does not
include any audio or visual of the conversation between Officer Kingland and Officers Miles and
Ellison.
Officer Lane's on-body video recording begins with Officer Lane driving in his patrol car
approximately one minute before arriving on scene. (State's Ex. 2 at 00:00-00:50.) When Officer
Lane arrives on scene, many other patrol cars and officers are visible. (See State's Ex. 2 at 00:50-
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00:55.) This video does not include any audio or visual of the conversation between Officer
Kingland and Officers Miles and Ellison.
Officer Miles's on-body video recording begins with Officer Miles in his patrol car,
approximately 15 seconds before arriving on scene. (State's Ex. 1, at 00:00-00:17.) Officer Miles
arrives on scene, exits his patrol car, shuts the door, and approaches a parked patrol car. (State's
Ex. 1 at 00: 17-00: 19.) The video shows the ground-neither Officer Kingland nor anyone else
can be seen, and there is no audio initially. (State's Ex. 1 at 00:19-00:32.) The audio commences
at the 30-second mark, but the conversation between Officer Kingland and Officer Miles and
Ellison can be neither seen nor heard. (See id.) Officer Miles walks away from the patrol car,
approaches Ms. Riley's car, identifies himself, and begins questioning Ms. Riley approximately
32 seconds into the recording. (State's Ex. 1 at 00:32.)
The district court said these videos "speak for themselves." (R., p. 75.) Indeed they do.
And what these videos say is that the length of the conversation between Officer Kingland and
the backup officers cannot be determined, as the conversations ''were not captured in any of the
videos admitted." (R., p.79.) Officer Kingland testified the conversation was "brief," but could
not say more specifically how long it lasted. (Tr., p.28, Ls.15-21.) In light of the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing, the district court did not clearly err in fmding the
conversation lasted longer than 40 seconds.
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D.

The District Court Correctly Concluded Officer Kingland Unlawfully Extended The
Duration Of Ms. Riley's Seizure By Asking Her If She Had Any Illegal Items In Her
Vehicle And By Having A Conversation With The Backup Officers Which Was
Unrelated To The Purpose Of The Stop
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects "[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures .... " U.S. Const. amend. IV. "The seizure of a vehicle's occupants in order to
investigate a traffic violation is a 'reasonable seizure' under the Fourth Amendment so long as
the seizing officer had reasonable suspicion that a violation had occurred." State v. Linze, 161
Idaho 605, 608 (2016) (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015)). However,
"[b]ecause addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate that purpose." Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 (quotation marks and brackets
omitted). "Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are-or
reasonably should have been-completed." Id.
In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held that "a police stop exceeding the
time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield
against unreasonable seizures." 575 U.S. at 350. The Court explained, "[t]he critical question ...
is ... whether conducting the sniff prolongs-i.e., adds time to-the stop." Id. at 355 (quotation
marks omitted). Here, the district court found Officer Kingland made two detours from the
mission of the traffic stop which prolonged, or added time, to the stop. (R., p.84.) The district
court recognized the resulting delay was de minimus, but nonetheless concluded it violated
Ms. Riley's Fourth Amendment rights under the standard set forth in Rodriguez. (Id.) The district
court did not err.
The district court correctly found Officer Kingland "deviated from the mission of the
traffic stop when he asked [Ms. Riley] questions about illegal items in her vehicle and when he
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explained to other officers his desire that the officers find some way to search her car for drugs
and why he wanted them to do that." (R., p.82.) These deviations were aimed at investigating a
possible drug crime for which Officer Kingland lacked reasonable suspicion. They thus
constituted a temporary abandonment of the stop. See State v. Still, 166 Idaho 351, 356 (Ct. App.
2019) (explaining that, pursuant to Rodriguez, "an abandonment occurs when officers deviate
from the purpose of the traffic mission in order to investigate, or engage in safety measures
aimed at investigating crimes unrelated to roadway safety for which the officers lack reasonable
suspicion").
The district court also correctly found that these two deviations prolonged, or added time,
to the stop, as the State did not meet its burden of proving to the contrary. (R., p.82.) The United
States Supreme Court made clear in Rodriguez that even a de minimus delay violates the
protections of the Fourth Amendment. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356; see also Linze, 161 Idaho
at 609, note 2 ("While [a two and a half minute delay] could reasonably be considered de

minimus, the United States Supreme Court was clear in Rodriguez that de minimus exceptions
are no longer available."). Thus, Officer Kingland' s delay here bears constitutional significance,
and the district court correctly granted Ms. Riley's motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Riley respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order granting
her motion to suppress.
DATED this 23 rd day ofJune, 2020.
/ s/ Andrea W. Reyno Ids
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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